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Walter Eucken`s Principles of Economic Policy Today 
 
By Ulrich van Suntum, Tobias Böhm, Jens Oelgemöller and Cordelius Ilgmann 




Walter Eucken was the head of the Freiburg school of economics, a circle of  German ordoliberal 
scholars of the interwar period, whose thoughts were highly influential in the immediate post war 
period. Being disillusioned by what he called the “age of experiments”- the failure of both classical 
liberalism and socialism - he formulated eleven principles for what he called a market economy, in 
which competition would not only limit the extent of private economic power, but also lead to an 
efficient allocation of resources and hence to economic prosperity. Although the principles never 
received much international attention, in light of recent economic research on both institutions and 
welfare economics, the essence of Eucken’s work appears to be very modern indeed. This paper 
highlights these parallels and proposes a reformulation of Eucken`s principles against the background 
of modern economic theory. We thus attempt to make a contribution to the current debate on the 
efficient design of those institutions that shape economic activity.  
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After being named the sick man of Europe at the turn of the millennium (Sinn, 2003, p. 13), 
Germany seems to have become the economic powerhouse of Europe. Unlike most other 
developed economies, its unemployment rate only increased by a relatively small margin 
during the recent financial turmoil. Given the high export share exceeding 30 percent in 
Germany and, hence, the strong adverse impact of the decline in world trade on GDP, this 
German  “Jobwunder”  was  rather  astounding.  Miracles  are  however  comparably  rare  in 
economics, so it makes sense to search for some better explanation for this outstanding 
success. The IMF (2011a, p. 6) attributes the German labor market performance to several 
factors; among them are not only the “Hartz IV” reforms, but also the flexibility incorporated 
into  collective  labor  agreements,  e.  g.  work-time  accounts,  and  the  subsidy for  reduced 
work-time hours (Kurzarbeit). Moreover, the IMF (2011a) estimates that German GDP will 
rise by three percent in 2011. Against the background of the problems in Greece, Ireland and 
the United States, German policy-makers might feel less inclined to continue with structural 
reforms. The long-term growth prospects are, however, much less impressive, with potential 
output growth estimated at between 1¼ and 1½ percent (IMF, 2011a, p. 5). Hence, Ashok 
Mody of the IMF’s European Department concludes that Germany is experiencing a robust 
cyclical  recovery,  but  not  yet  evidently  much  more  than  that  (IMF  2011b).  Therefore, 
Germany needs to continue on its path of structural reform if it wants to boost growth and 
economic prosperity in the years to come.  
But what kind of reforms should one envision? Given the controversy about the previous 
labor  market  reforms,  any  fundamental  reshaping  of  the  institutions  that  make  up  the 
German economic system will most likely meet strong resistance if it is perceived  to be 
unfair.  If  faced  with  a  perceived  choice  between  economic  equality  and  efficiency,  the 
majority of Germans appear to be willing to sacrifice the latter for the former. This is not a 
new dilemma. After the Second World War, the German neoliberals – with Ludwig Erhard 
being their most prominent and powerful figure – were faced with a similar choice, albeit 
with  the  threat  of  Marxism  looming  large.  Their  solution  –  generally  speaking  –  was  a 
concept called the Social Market Economy (SME) which strove to combine core elements of 
market competition with a considerable degree of social policy and hence public consensus. 
Historically in its theoretical conception, it was closely related to the political and economic 
philosophy of Ordoliberalism as developed by a group of protestant economists and lawyers 
in the 1930s, the so-called Freiburg school with Walter Eucken  acting as the intellectual 
leader (Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth, 2008). 
However, no widely-accepted ideological body of ordoliberal thought such as in the case of 
Marxism ever existed, but rather a collection of scholarly and political writings that were 
loosely connected to each other in their attempt to find a middle way between a ‘laissez-
faire’ market economy and planned economy (Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth, 2008, p. 264). 
Still, one unifying element of all SME writings is the emphasis on competition as a public 3 
 
good  that  needs  to  be  safeguarded  against  private  economic  power.  In  its  practical 
implementation  after  the  Second  World  War,  the  distributive  and  corporative  elements 
within  the  German  economy  played  a  much  larger  role  than  originally  intended  by 
Germany´s first minister of economics, Ludwig Erhard (Wehler, 2008, p. 75 and 133). For 
example, he opposed Konrad Adenauer’s pension reform that raised retirement benefits by 
a considerable margin. Other labor market institutions specific to Germany, like worker’s 
participation in both operational management and in the boards of management, originated 
from the powerful role of unions, which were thus integrated in the new economic and 
social order. Consequently, a mixed system prevailed, more accurately described as Rhenish 
Capitalism. This system lacked a consistent theoretical background and incorporated various 
strands of thought – such as those of the catholic social school or those of social democrats – 
and existing institutions. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings and the lack of a consistent 
theoretical foundation, the SME proved extremely successful in the years from 1948 to the 
mid-1960s, thereby founding the myth of the “Wirtschaftswunder” (Wehler, 2008, p. 74). 
Beginning  in  the  early  1970s,  the  degree  of  regulation  in  Germany’s  SME  continually 
increased with rising public expenditure shares and state intervention. However, in the early 
1980s, the liberal idea was reestablished by substantial deregulation and liberalization, e.g. 
in the telecommunication, energy and transport sector. However, many of these were half-
heartedly  implemented  with  serious  unintended  consequences.  For  example,  the 
transformation of the German railway authorities into a publicly-owned joint stock company 
did little to improve quality and punctuality. Moreover, given its political influence as one of 
Germany’s biggest corporations, it has so far been successful at keeping the legal barriers to 
competition intact, as for example the ban on national bus lines. Most importantly, it has 
succeeded  in  keeping  the  operation  of  the  network  under  its  control,  which  allows  the 
Deutsche Bahn to effectively restrain competition. Similar things could be said about the 
energy sector. Thus, the so called ‘neo liberal’ policies of the 1980s and beyond failed to 
deliver results and created in many cases privately owned monopolies.  
After  reunification,  when  the  recovery  of  the  former  Eastern  Germany  from  socialism 
required  much  more  time  than  originally  anticipated,  various  liberalizations  in  capital 
markets in the mid-2000s were implemented – with disastrous consequences as prudent 
regulation and oversight were abandoned in favor of a doctrine of regulation via ‘market 
discipline’,  which  failed  utterly  in  the  aftermath  of  Lehman.  This  liberalization  was 
accompanied with a substantial deregulation of labor markets. In addition, the system of 
unemployment insurance was reformed substantially by the so-called Hartz-reforms, named 
after the head of the relevant round-table commission at that time.
1 Particularly for those 
unemployed who need not to care for children, the incentives to work rose substantially, 
and new forms of part time labor and  temporary employment emerged. Large parts of the 
German job miracle were certainly due to these reforms,  although the larger part of the 
                                                           
1 See Wurzel (2006) who investigated the German labour market reform. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) 
show, that higher transfer to unemployed increase duration of unemployment. A general survey of labour 
market intervention delivers Heckman et al (1999). 4 
 
population paid for them with stagnating real incomes. Worse, while real incomes at the top 
rose substantially, the real wage of unskilled labor even decreased. Thus, it is no wonder 
that many Germans express massive doubts about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
SME at the beginning of the 21
st century.  
Hence,  the  German  version  of  the  SME  inevitably  requires  further  adjustment  to  meet 
challenges  that  became  apparent  only  decades  after  the  model  came  into  existence: 
globalization, ecological overstressing, demographic change and evolving social values and 
expectations to name a few. Probably driven by the prospect of reelection, postwar German 
governments of any color have increased social security and tried to redistribute income via 
taxation, while neglecting the institutional design of the economy as outlined above. Hence, 
while the state played an ever more active role in economic activity, a growing inequality in 
income and social participation persisted. Much of this inequality was due to serious defects 
in institutional design, such as the widespread lack of liability, the continued existence of 
monopolies  and  the  continuous  pressure  of  private  lobby  groups  on  political  decision-
making.  Such  an  economic  order  is not  only unjust  from  a  liberal perspective,  it is  also 
grossly inefficient. Therefore, the key task for policy makers in the 21
st century is to redesign 
those  parts  of  the  economic,  legal  and  political  institutions  which  have  given  rise  to 
economic and political rent seeking and thus have contributed to the growing perception of 
social inequality.  
Of course, a simple ´back to the roots` approach based on a faithful exegesis of the existing 
ordoliberal  thought  is  not  enough  to  tackle  today’s  problems.  For  example,  the  goal  of 
economic policy in the 21
st century cannot lie in achieving more material welfare alone. 
While the founding fathers of the SME emphasized the importance of non-material goods 
such as political stability and public consensus, current debates increasingly revolve around 
fostering well-being and enabling broad political participation as well as social mobility and 
inclusion. Despite the fact that the Freiburg School emerged out of the German context, 
many other countries, particularly the Nordic states, have developed characteristics of a 
modern  SME  through  their  own  historical  developments  and  therefore  have  further 
experience to contribute to the debate. Therefore, in order to assess the merits of the idea 
of  the  SME  in  the  world  of  today,  one  has  to  broaden  the  scope  in  several  respects. 
Consequently  we  try  to  determine  how  the  original  concepts  from  the  1930s  can  be 
translated and transformed in light of modern economic and political science. These are the 
key questions which we tackle in the following. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section (2), the fundamental ordoliberal 
concept according to the Freiburger school and its modifications by Alfred Müller Armack 
and others are briefly described. Section (3) attempts to translate the concept of SME into 
modern economic terms and suggests some deficiencies and modifications from the view of 
both modern economics and the current beyond GDP debate. Section (4) discusses possible 
measures of the main principles of a modern version of the SME and comments on their 5 
 
assessment from the normative view of ordoliberalism. Section (6) is devoted to concluding 
remarks.  
Historical Background: SME and the Ordoliberal School 
 
The  German  ordoliberals  of  the  interwar  period  were  an  informal  group  of  academic 
economists  and  lawyers  who  tried  to  find  a  “third  way”  between  pure  liberalism  and 
socialism. Intellectually headed by Walter Eucken, other prominent members were Franz 
Böhm, Leonhard Miksch, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow at that time. Although no 
official  program  existed  and  their  views  differed  in  some  respects,  Eucken`s  writings 
undoubtedly stand out as the most comprehensive and from an economic standpoint the 
best founded  basis of ordoliberal  thought  (Müller, 2007,  p. 101).  His  research  question, 
which all ordoliberal authors of the time shared, albeit with different answers, was: ‘How 
can modern industrialized economy and society be organized in a human and efficient way?’ 
(Eucken,  1951,  p.  27).  His  principles,  which  will  be  discussed  below,  constitute  his 
comprehensive answer. However, the solution to the problem of what needs to be done 
automatically led him to a second problem. Who was to implement and safe-guard such an 
‘order’ against organized group interest? This is the question Eucken struggles with in his 
principles and which even he fails to answer satisfactorily.  
Walter  Eucken,  son  of  Nobel  Price-winner  in  Literature  Rudolf  Eucken,  grew  up  in  an 
extraordinarily literate social background and studied history, public sciences, economics 
and law. His main works, “The foundations of political economy” (1939) and “Principles of 
economic  policy”  (1952,  posthumously),
2 were originally published  exclusively  in German 
and only became available in English in 1950 and 1952, respectively. Unfortunately, having 
been invited by Hayek to give three lectures at the London School of Economics in 1950, he 
died of a heart attack before having finished the last lecture (which was then given by A. 
Peacock the next day).
3 Another obstacle for a better acknowledgement of his thought in 
modern  economics  is  his  informal  methodology  tog ether  with  his  broad  scope  and 
philosophical approach, which  renders his work difficult to formalize. This is all the more 
regrettable, because unlike other members of the school, Eucken was an exceptionally clear 
economic  thinker  who  explicitly  abhorred  w hat  he  called  ´pure  word  economists ’ 
(“Begriffsnationalökonomen”, see Grossekettler 2010, p. 296). 
All ordoliberals in a wider sense agreed on the notion that a truly liberal economy was not 
given per se, but required careful institutional design. With reference to the political sphere, 
the need for a constitutional system of checks and balances in democratic society had been 
widely accepted since the time of Montesquieu. They argued in favor of a fixed set of rules 
for economic activity that would limit private economic power. Indeed, they argued that 
                                                           
2  
3 The Lectures were then published posthumously (Eucken, 1951). 6 
 
political  freedom  would  prove  impossible  as  long  as  economic  order  would  grant  some 
individuals  power  over  others  (Yeager,  2005,  p.  508).  Thus,  scholars  of  the  History  of 
Economic Thought have classified ordoliberal thought as the German idiosyncratic strand of 
the wider neo-liberal movement of the time, the Freiburg school being it’s most prominent 
and comprehensive body of thought. Interestingly, and contrary to public perception, in 
many respects close links exist to the Austrian school of economics, in particular to Hayek, 
who directly followed Eucken as the department  chair in Freiburg. However,  essentially, 
Eucken´s concept was less evolutionary than Hayek’s and put much more emphasis on a 
strong, although liberally-oriented state. The ordo-label stems from the identically named 
German  journal  which  was  founded  by  Eucken  and  Böhm  1948  and  is  still  the  house 
magazine of their modern successors. Because articles in ORDO are published in German 
only, the school’s recognition abroad was substantially lower than it was in Germany, where 
it  has  also  significantly  declined  in  recent  years.
4 At the time being, there is an intense 
debate in Germany about the future of ordoliberal thinking in the light of its insignificance in 
international mainstream economics. 
Given  that many members of the school  were either actively involved in the resistance 
against the Nazis or went into exile, they were politically unsuspicious in the immediate post 
war period when the Allies we re looking for German   economists.  Hence, they  became 
sought-after  advisors and played a big role in shaping the postwar economic order in 
Germany. For example, Eucken and Mikitsch were both working in what was to become the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs , and were close advisors to Ludwig Ehrhard   (1897-1977), 
Germany’s  first  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs  and  Adenauer’s  successor  as  chancellor. 
Moreover,  Alfred  Müller-Armack  (1901-1978),  professor  of  economics  and  later  State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Affairs who coined the term SME in 1946, referred 
extensively to ordoliberal scholars. Above all, he embraced their key notion that competition 
and hence a market economy required careful institutional design. However, Müller-Armack 
disagreed  with  Eucken  in  one  important  aspect.  While  Eucken  argued  that  a  truly 
competitive  market  economy  would  automatically  lead  to  social  justice  because  income 
would be distributed according to merit,
5 Müller-Armack emphasized the need for a much 
stronger policy of income redistribution and social security. Thus, Eucken’s work is only a 
part, although an important one, of the original theoretical concept of SME as advocated by 
Müller-Armack  and  Erhard.  Moreover,  there  are  considerable  differences  between  the 
theoretical  concept  and  the  implemented  economic  system  of  the  postwar  years 
(Goldschmidt and Wohlgemuth, 2008). Finally, the slogan of SME has been used widely in 
the  political  and  public  sphere  as  to  give  legitimacy  to  political  parties  and  decisions. 
Interestingly,  nearly  all  political  parties,  but  also  private  interest  groups,  have  used  the 
slogan in their favor, which testifies to its integrating power in the public arena and also to 
                                                           
4 A comprehensive review of the ordoliberal school in English can be found in the articles by H. Peukert (2000), 
C. Watrin (2000) and K.W. Nörr (2000) in P. Koslowski (2000) 
5 This is not to say that Eucken argued against social security as such. For example, he saw the need to care for 
the elderly and disabled who are not able to earn their living on the labour market. His emphasis however was 
on establishing a competitive order, the outcome of which he saw as efficient.  7 
 
its lack of intellectual consistency. Thus, we believe that Eucken’s principles depicting the 
core of the market element of the SME offer the only consistent and comprehensive starting 
point for an articulation of a modern SME today. Given the current turmoil on financial 
markets, this acutely needed reformulation finds relevance not only in Germany, but among 
an international audience as well.  
The Ordoliberal Freiburg Concept of a Market Economy 
 
The  essence  of  the  Freiburg  strand  of  ordoliberalism  lies  in  what  Eucken  deemed  the 
constitutive (K) and regulative (R) principles of a market economy in his work of 1952 (see 
Table I).
6 
Table I: Eucken`s Original Set of Principles 
K1  Functioning price system 
K2  Primacy of the monetary order 
K3  Open markets 
K4  Private property 
K5  Freedom of contract 
K6  Liability 
K7  Continuity of Economic Policy 
R1  Antitrust Policy 
R2  Income Policy 
R3  Correction of Externalities 
R4  Correction of anomalous labor supply 
 
The seven constitutive principles can be briefly described as follows: 
(1)  A  functioning  price  system  of  perfect  competition.  This  presents  the  fundamental 
principle according to Eucken. He regarded a decentralized market structure a prerequisite 
of a well-functioning price system in contrast to Austrian dynamic concepts of competition 
advanced by Hayek and Schumpeter.  
(2) By primacy of the monetary order Eucken has mainly the stability of the value of currency 
in mind. Eucken`s idea on this issue was a commodity-bundle standard instead of the gold-
standard and a 100% reserve requirement for banks, i.e. a combination of  the plans by 
Graham (1937) and Simons (1948).  
                                                           
6 The English translation is borrowed from Peukert (2000, p. 122). 8 
 
(3)  Open  markets  mean  the  absence  of  prohibitive tariffs  and  other  restrictions  on free 
trade, and also any form of anticompetitive measures to protect “the home market, e.g. by 
predatory pricing against outsiders or even by suggestive advertisement. 
(4) Private property is meant by Eucken mainly as a means of power distribution which must, 
however, be bound by competition. 
(5) Freedom of contract is proposed only to the extent that it is compatible with perfect 
competition, e.g. as long as it does not support cartels or any other abusive practice. 
(6) The principle of liability addresses in particular corporate law. Eucken´s radical view on 
this issue was that the majority stockholders should be fully liable. 
(7)  Continuity  of  economic  policy  means  that  the  latter  should  be  both  reliable  and 
predictable for market participants (Grossekettler 2010, 324). 
The constitutional principles are complemented by four regulative principles (Peukert 2000, 
p. 124):  
(1)  Antitrust  policy  according  to  Eucken  should  be  conducted  by  a  public  agency  which 
should ideally dissolve monopolies or at least control their market behavior. This proposal 
led to the German law against barriers to competition in 1957. 
(2)  Eucken  explicitly  associated  Income  policy  with  a  progressive  income  tax  which  he 
favored both for distributional and efficiency reasons (the latter because it dampens the 
production of luxury goods and thus gives room for more investment). 
(3) Correction of externalities is mainly discussed by Eucken in ecological terms, pointing 
among others to the destruction of North American woods. 
(4) Correction of anomalous labor supply means regulations on the length of the working day 
and other protective measures of workers, in particular of children and women. 
Eucken`s work remained unique in spite of many valuable contributions of later ordoliberal 
writers. The concept was modified substantially after World War II by Müller-Armack and 
Erhard, who implemented it in German economic policy against vigorous opposition, namely 
by the unions. They modified the concept of a social market economy to allow for both 
“market  conform”  interventions  and  active  business  cycle  policy,  and  to  place  a  much 
stronger weight on welfare policy including, inter alia, social housing policy, pension and 
health policy and family aid policy. It was now widely acknowledged that welfare policy 
should go beyond simple income redistribution,  including, for example,  substantial labor 
protection.  
However, the further development of the social market economy was more eclectic and 
policy-driven rather than following a well-defined conception. By contrast, in the light of 
modern  economic  theory,  Eucken`s  original  contribution  turns  out  to  be  particularly 9 
 
attractive. It not only anticipates important ideas like the concept of time inconsistency and 
the principal agent problem, but also forms a consistent set of interdependent institutions, 
without any of which the entire concept would become invalid; only the interplay of the 
entire set of principles comprises his model of an ideal market economy. 
Sixty years have passed since Eucken`s Principles from 1952 were published. The world has 
changed  a  great  deal  since  then,  and  so  have  individual  behavior  and  social  values. 
Therefore, in order to fairly assess Eucken`s ideas in a modern setting, one has to vet their 
fundamental content and verify whether they remain relevant and appropriate today. 
  
Elements of a Responsible Market Economy  
To  begin  with,  for  a  modern  interpretation,  it  does  not  make  much  sense  to  maintain 
Eucken´s  distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative  principles.  By  contrast, 
contemporary institutional economics covers both general rules and procedures. Moreover, 
some of Eucken´s principles are quite closely related to each other, so their number can be 
reduced.  
Moreover, many things have changed substantially since Eucken and the other proponents 
of ordoliberalism wrote. First, economic theory has made some progress, not least due to 
rigorous empirical and experimental testing methods which were not available at Eucken`s 
time. Second, while many economic and social problems of Eucken’s time persist until today, 
new challenges like globalization and scarceness of non-renewable resources have emerged. 
Last but not least, social values have changed substantially, in particular with respect to the 
importance assigned to economic growth and both the definition and relative weight of 
social justice. Some of the principles have also to be modified or broadened substantially in 
scope. 
 In particular, we suggest rearranging them in the following way: 
(1) Open  markets,  competition,  and  market  prices  all  refer  to  decentralized  allocation 
decisions in a competitive system. Thus they can be summarized as the general principle 
of  competitive  market  allocation.  Unlike  Eucken`s  narrow  yardstick  of  perfect 
competition, the concept should now refer to modern competition theory.
7  
(2) Analogously, the principles of private property, freedom of contract, and liability can be 
headed by the general principle of a framework for efficient property rights. Here the 
results of both welfare economics and modern institutional economics, concerning e.g. 
the  principal  agent  problem,  are  taken  into  consideration.  The  internalization  of 
externalities  can  also  partly  be  subsumed  under  this  heading  since,  in  general, 
internalization works through generating property rights in order to create a price for the 
externality. 
                                                           
7 See, for example, Tirole (1988) and Carlton and Perloff (2005). 10 
 
(3) There is also a close link between consistency of policy, primacy of currency policy, and 
the  ecological  issue  (the  latter  being  tackled  by  Eucken  under  the  heading  of 
externalities). All of these principles refer to  sustainability in the sense of long term 
oriented behavior. This problem is also discussed under the heading of time consistency 
in contemporary economics. 
(4) Finally, Eucken`s regulative principles of income policy and correction for “anomalous 
labor supply” are both special causes of the large field of welfare policy, including the 
legal constitution of the labor market. In contrast to Eucken`s time, these issues are no 
longer discussed in terms of mere income support measures today, but in the much 
broader context of social inclusion.  
Hence we are left with only four instead of the original eleven principles of ordoliberalism 
for what now may best be called a Responsible Market Economy (see Table II).  
Table II: Eucken`s Principles Rearranged and Consolidated 
K1  Efficient Price System 
1) Competitive Market Allocation  K3  Open Markets 
R1  Competition 
K4  Private Property 
2) Framework for Efficient Property 
Rights 
K5  Freedom of contract 




3) Economic and Ecological 
Sustainability  K7  Sustainable Rules 
K2  Financial Stability 
R2  Social Inclusion  4) Social Inclusion 
R4  Effective Labor Markets 
 
Before going into detail, it must be stressed that neither economic theory nor social values 
are undisputed issues. On the contrary, divergence concerning these matters is hardly less 
today  than  it  was  at  Eucken`s  time,  even  among  economists.  So  any  statement  of 
fundamental  economic  principles  requires a  clear  focus,  which  must  be  normative  by 
definition. It makes  sense  to assess the principles  stated above from the  point of  view of 
those whose ideas they refer to, i.e. from the viewpoint of a modern, ordoliberal economist. 
This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  they  could  not  be  disputed  or  even  be  principally 
dismissed from proponents of divergent economic perspectives. The more important issue 11 
 
is, however, that these principles are consistent both with each other and with the state of 
contemporary economic theory.  
 
Competitive market allocation 
To  start  with,  what  are  the  core  elements  and  the  merits  of  the  first  principle,  called 
competitive  market  allocation  above?  For  an  economist,  this  may  be  more  or  less  self-
evident. Vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, treats this question.
8 Leaving apart 
specific problems like externalities and asymmetrical information, economists widely agree 
on the general application of the so-called first theorem of welfare economics. According to 
this theorem, the competitive market solution generally ensures a Paretian solution of the 
allocation problem, i.e. within given endowments, the welfare of one cannot be improved 
without reducing the welfare of someone else.
9 Although the theorem is only derived from 
mainly static, abstract economic models, it is also supported, in principle, by more dynamic 
concepts of competition theory.
10 Admittedly, there are a lot of different views on particular 
problems like natural and morphological monopolies, the efficiency of oligopolies , or the 
relevance  of  market  structure  versus  market  behavior.  In  essence,  however,  there  is 
widespread agreement that  decentralized units with a minimum of market power should 
make allocation decisions, and that public interventions should generally favor more  rather 
than less competition. Hayek
11 famously made the even more fundamental point that the 
core problem of allocation is the  aggregation of  vast amounts of information, dispersed 
among millions of decentralized market  participants, which can never be  elicited by any 
public agency.  
What  practical implications can be derived from this discussion ?  In general, one has to 
define  a  set  of  rules  that  would  ensure   that  competition  prevails  over  any  f orm  of 
concentrated  market power,  whether  private or public.  To achieve this, the  ordoliberal 
concept covers three requirements, namely open markets, a competitive price system, and 
effective  legislation  against  monopolies,  cartels  and  abuse  of  market  power.  The  la st 
element distinguishes  the  concept  of ordoliberalism from  simple laissez faire liberalism  
(Peukert 2000).  
A  competitive  price  system  does  not  only  rule  out  private  market  power  and  price -
agreements, but also price controls and related inte rventions  except in the presence of 
market failures e.g. externalities. In particular, this notion rejects  minimum and maximum 
                                                           
8 See Mas-Colell (1995) and the literature cited there in. 
9 See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995), chapter 10. 
10 The gap between theory and reality, especially the issue of imperfect information, is discussed by Stiglitz 
(2002). 
11 Although Hayek was not a member of the original ordoliberal school and proposed a more fundamentally 
liberal view, he was quite close to Eucken in many respects. Hayek held two times a chair in Freiburg and was 
even appointed as a president emeritus of the Eucken Institute in 1978. For more on their relations see Pies 
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prices in order to pursue distributional goals. The reason for this rejection is twofold: First, 
such  interventions  would  destroy  the  informational  content  of  prices  and,  hence,  the 
efficiency of allocation. Second, price interventions are not carefully targeted with respect to 
the  social  problem,  because  they  benefit  also  those  who  are  not  really  in  need. 
Consequently,  the  preferred  ordoliberal  instrument  for  social  targets  consists  of  income 
policy rather than price intervention. 
Open markets, in particular free trade and international factor mobility, present another 
component of competition. In light of economic theory, the former can be a substitute for 
the latter, although an imperfect one. The problem with competition from abroad lies in the 
fact that its restriction in many cases carries advantages for the home country, or at least for 
some pressure groups there. On the other hand, from a global and long-run point of view, 
open markets are the much better option in most cases. In other words, open markets have 
a public good character, and can therefore only be preserved by international agreements 
like GATT and WTO.  
Concerning monopoly and cartel legislation, there are quite different approaches in practice, 
depending on the underlying concept of competition. For the same reason, it is not easy to 
measure  the  degree  of  competitiveness  in  most  markets.  A  natural  monopoly  under 
substantial pressure from substitute goods may act more competitively than a firm within a 
stable oligopoly, for example. Moreover, prices need not be competitive or even low when 
they  equal  unit  costs,  because  the  latter  may  be  artificially  inflated.  So  the  relevant 
information concerning competition is less the market structure or market results than the 
prevailing market power, which can be measured by various concepts.  
Efficient Property Rights 
The second principle, called Framework for efficient property rights above, is also at the very 
heart of ordoliberal thought. In particular, private property is seen as an essential for both 
efficiency and liberty. In contrast to Aristotle and the catholic social school, it is not derived 
from natural rights, but mainly established because of division of power and the positive 
incentives generated thereby (Peukert 2000, 123). Without private property all firms would 
finally  belong  to the  state  ruling out  genuine competition. Moreover,  common property 
generates externalities which would interfere with both an efficient allocation and social 
freedom. With common property, the natural incentives for investment, maintenance, and 
careful use must be substituted by law, thereby creating both bureaucracy and permanent 
quarrel about personal rights and obligations. In the 1930s, a famous debate took place, 
with mainly Ludwig von Mises opposing Oskar Lange and Abba P. Lerner, concerning the 
option  of  competitive  socialism.  Both  theoretical  arguments  and  empirical  evidence  in 
former  Yugoslavia  finally  demonstrated  that  the  combination  of  decentralized  allocation 13 
 
decisions and common property (with centralized investment and public price control) does 
not really work.
12 
However, private property is only a necessary, but not a sufficient requirement  for efficient 
property rights. Efficient property rights  also call for  a minimum degree of freedom of 
contract, in line with the notion of liability. As a striking example, the recent financial crisis 
arose not least because  liberalization of financial markets had not been backed by a 
respective tightening of  liability rules, in particular for manag ers and consultants. In this 
respect, Eucken was even skeptical of private limited companies, because of the principal 
agent problem as it is called in modern institutional economics today.
13 Admittedly, it is not 
easy at all to design a set of rules that balance the need for liability against the willingness to 
take risk, which is also essential for a market economy.  Presumably, the huge investments 
which are needed in a modern industrial economy  would have never been made by small 
and medium enterprises without limitation of liability. On the other hand,  many misguided 
investments and spectacular crashes could also have been avoided.  
Concerning modern economics, broad literature exists on this issue, both in terms of (game)-
theory and empirical evidence. Among others, this research has resulted in  both practical 
rules for good governance and the design of principal -agent relations.
14 From a modern 
economic point of view, the question is no longer if but under which conditions to allow for 
decision-making by people who do not directly bear the respective  risks and  costs. One 
should note that this problem is at least as  much of an issue in the public sector as it is in 
private firms. 
Another important element of   property rights is legal certainty. Without protection of 
investors (including intellectual property) and the rule of law even properly defined property 
rights  cannot  work  because  of  lacking  enforceability.  This  also  applies  in  the  case  of 
corruption, because the latter implies a violation of existing property rights by definition. 
Legal certainty is  also a precondition for economic confidence, in particular concerning 
foreign direct investment and savings.  
The problem of externalities is their separation of the power of decision from liability, which 
is a core requirement of efficiency.
15 Thus, in general, the existence of externalities  – 
regardless of whether negative or positive - leads to a failure of the first theorem of welfare 
economics.  Important  examples  are  environment  pollution  and  the  free  use  of  limited 
natural  resources.  While  in  politics  the  common  answer  to  these  problems  is  civil  and 
regulatory law, economists generally prefer market instruments in order to internalize the 
externalities. The reason is that the optimal level of consumption of resources is generally 
above zero, but depends on the opportunity costs of prevention or substitution respectively. 
However, these opportunity costs cannot be known by any political institution but could be 
                                                           
12 A modern view on all aspects surrounding property rights can be found in Segal and Whinston (forthcoming).  
13 A very comprehensive overview of principal agent problems within firms is provided by Prendergast (1999). 
14 The literature on Corporate Governance is extensively covered in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
15 The classic reference on externalities is Coase (1937). See also Laffont (2008).  14 
 
better  detected  by  market  mechanism.
16 Thus  the  natural  solution  would  be   installing 
appropriate instruments like  CO2  emission  certificates  or green taxes in order to make 
market players take into account the true costs generated by their decisions.
17 
Although well-founded in the theory of welfare, market instruments in environmental policy 
are often  opposed in politics. The reasons include both  the difficulty of  measuring, in 
particular, potential and future, long-term externality costs as well as distributive arguments, 
as the internalization of external costs would imply higher prices of the respective goods. As 
a result, in reality direct interventions like prohibitions and regulations are frequently 
preferred above market instruments.  
 The  ordoliberal  criticism of this  tendency  is threefold: First, it is a threat o f individual 
freedom. Second,  this policy  is unfair because it  tend to  discriminate between activities 
which involve the same amount of externalities. Third, market instruments along with direct 
distributional measures could achieve the same degree of environment protection  at lower 
opportunity costs and voluntary degrees of redistribution.  
Externalities do not only occur in the use of environment and free resources, bu t are also 
identified in many other fields of modern economic theory. For example, the too -big-to-fail 
problem with financial institutions can be seen as a negative externality in analogy to a fire 
hazard, as it was already recognized by Adam Smith. Positi ve externalities may arise from 
education  and  R&D  (e.g.  knowledge  spillovers  to  the  rest  of  the  economy),  which  is 
frequently taken  as  an  argument for  subsidizing  these  activities.  While  this  is  a  valid 
argument in theory, ordoliberals are mostly skeptical about the practical feasibility, because 
the respective externalities are neither easy to quantify nor can substantial bandwagon 
effects be ruled out. This does not mean that respective subsidies could not pay off, but 
there are good arguments that they s hould, in principle, be restricted to obvious cases 
where private incentives are clearly too weak.  
It should also be noted on this occasion that even in theoretical welfare economics, not all 
externalities  need  internalization.  In  particular,  when  interna lization  does  not  change 
behavior substantially  (like e.g. in the case of cigarette taxes) , the externalities are not 
Pareto-relevant but have distributional effects. Thus, taking into account the resulting 
transaction costs, bandwagon effects and bureaucracy, in many cases internalization would 
not improve but even damage welfare.   This theoretical argument corresponds with the 
general ordoliberal concern that a too high degree of public intervention could undermine 
individual freedom to an inappropriate degree.  
  
 
                                                           
16 This problem is discussed in the basic paper of Baumol and Oates (1971). 
17 Endres and Finus (2002) illustrate in their paper, that quotas may be superior to tax agreements. 15 
 
 Economic and Ecological Sustainability  
 Continuity  and  reliability  of  economic  policy  is  a  precondition  for  confidence  of  both 
investors  and  foreign  trading  partners.  Without  confidence  in  turn,  there  will  be  less 
investment,  less  gains  from  trade  and,  hence,  less  welfare  and  growth  than  would  be 
otherwise possible. To a certain degree, there is an overlap with the efficient property rights 
principle, because investor protection, rule of law and absence of corruption are also core 
elements  of  economic  reliability  and  sustainability.  However,  economic  reliability  would 
imply much more than efficient property rights. First and foremost, legislation should give 
investors  and  taxpayers  a  reliable  basis  for  their  decisions  and,  therefore,  must  not  be 
changed substantially within a too short period of time. This is not easy to achieve, because 
it is often in governmental interest to change incentives ex post when benefits have already 
been reaped and the costs in terms of loss of reputation and confidence can be rolled over 
to  future  generations  of  politicians.
18 
19 In  other  words,  problem s  of  time-inconsistent 
policies are lastly the result of an intergenerational externality which can only be overcome 
by long-term rules or meta -rules which  a simple majority  cannot easily  alter. This  also 
applies  to  the  ecological  issue,  which  is  a  key  matter  of  sustainability .  Generally, 
sustainability does not result from good will  but requires appropriate institutional incentive 
arrangements  like  pollution taxes,  the  independence of central banks or constitutional 
brakes to public expenses or debt taking. 
Other important elements of economic sustainability are the stability of both financial and 
political institutions, steady savings and education levels and a balanced foreign account, the 
latter  meaning  that  it  also  forms  a  long-run  equilibrium.  However,  there  are  neither 
undisputed definitions nor obvious measures for these  quite sophisticated  requirements. 
Therefore, in order to make them operational, one  has to rely on more or less arbitrary 
considerations and figures that, in themselves, are of only secondary importance and related 
to that which one actually seeks to measure 
For example, it seems natural t hat a relatively high level of equity  of both industrial and 
financial firms is more sustainable with respect to financial stability than excessive debt 
taking. Again, there is an overlap with the property rights issue   because equity is also 
preferable in terms of liability. Furthermore the share of both real investment and human 
capital investment should ensure at least the current standard of living in  the  future. 
Concerning the current account, there is no simple sustainability rule, because a deficit ca n 
either  reflect  lacking  competitiveness  or  attractive  investment  opportunities  or  both. 
However, high volatility of the current account and/or the exchange rate could point to non-
sustainable international relations of the respective economy.  
                                                           
18 A prime example of this kind of government behavior is the area of capital taxation. Governments have 
incentives to set low capital tax rates to attract firms ex ante. Ex post, i.e. after they have made their 
investment decision firms are (partly) locked in if it is costly to relocate their business, which could give 
governments an incentive to raise taxes.  
19 The problem of time inconsistencies was first formulated by Nobel Prize winners Kydland and Prescott 
(1977). Their insight and the subsequent literature are summarized in Klein (2009).  16 
 
 
Social Inclusion  
 Among all ordoliberal principles, the social issue is undoubtedly the one which has changed 
the most since the days of Eucken. Being more or less a concession to hardships at that time, 
social inclusion and participation are now defined much  more broadly, including cultural 
participation and substantial legal entitlements instead of mere existential relief. In a way, 
this tendency is self-enforcing, because the more people gain a substantial part of their 
income from non-market sources, the stronger their potential as a pressure group becomes. 
This may present one reason why Ludwig Erhard`s prediction that the importance of the 
social question would decline with inclining wealth turned out to be completely false.  
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  true  that  pure  alleviation  of  economic  hardships  proves 
insufficient for reducing inequality and achieving equal opportunities in society. In particular, 
social  mobility  can  only  be  improved  if  all  children  have  a  fair  chance  to  develop  their 
abilities,  independently  from  the  social  status  and  ethnic  background  of  their  family. 
Although the ordoliberals of the Freiburg school did not particularly stress this point, they 
would undoubtedly agree to it today, not least because better education generally goes 
along with positive externalities in favor of more growth and higher welfare for the economy 
as a whole.
20 
A much trickier point is the level of income  inequality which a modern society is willing to 
tolerate.  Neither  economic  theory  nor  empirical  researc h  can  provide  a  clear 
recommendation on this issue.  Nevertheless, from an  ordoliberal point of view, the more 
crucial  question  concerns  the  appropriate  instruments  for  distributional  goals.  As  was 
argued  above,  interventions  into  th e  market  mechanism  are  generally  assessed  as 
suboptimal. Ordoliberals would generally prefer indirect measures, in particular  those that 
improve the ability of recipients to improve their own situation and overcome the necessity 
of relying on the state for subsistence. Indeed, Eucken explicitly mentioned self-help and the 
subsidiary principle as complements to his main principles (Grossekettler 2010, 324).  Apart 
from  education,  important  examples  are  policies  that  impose  work  requirements  on 
recipients as e.g. the EITC in the US or the German “Kombilohn” or other workfare measures 
instead of unconditional benefits. The goal to promote self-help naturally limits the extent of 
redistribution,  as  sufficient  incentives  for  self-help  must  be  preserved.  On  this  point, 
ordoliberals and the catholic social school fully agree.  
Concerning  labor  market  constitution,  again  no  simple  formula  exists.  In  principle, 
ordoliberal economists are skeptical about wage cartels and all the more about minimum 
wages by law, because in both cases the competitive equilibrium wage is suspended. On the 
other hand, even Eucken recognized the possibility of exceptions to this rule, for instance if 
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anomalous labor supply would result in an unstable equilibrium or unacceptably low wages 
from a social point of view.  
In modern labor market analysis, many more reasons are discussed for market interventions, 
including  monopsonistic  labor  demand,  discrimination,  informational  asymmetries  and 
efficiency wages. There is also widespread political consensus that unions should be allowed 
to  monopolize  wage  bargaining  on  the  labor  supply  side,  and  that  strikes  ought  to  be 
allowed  to  enforce  their  claims.  Moreover,  workers’  respective.  union  representatives 
participate substantially in both economic and political decisions in many countries, up to 
codetermination  on  equal terms, as  for  example  in  German  supervisory  boards. Despite 
often  considerable  economic  costs  that  such  regulations  generate,  it  would  hardly  be 
possible to eliminate codetermination arrangements due purely to political considerations. 
Again, the ordoliberal view emphasizes balanced institutional design. For example, given the 
union  privileges,  it  is  important  that  there  a  countervailing  power  exists  on  the  labor 
demand  side  and  that  a  certain  bargaining  culture  ensures  fair  and  amicably  achieved 
agreements. Concerning labor market policy, the activation of the unemployed is certainly 
preferable  to  purely  passive  measures  like  early  retirement  or  generous  benefits. 
Analogously, labor protection legislation should be fair and give no incentives for abuse or 
saturation. Possible indications of inappropriate rules could be excessive strikes or pervasive 
lawsuits. One also has to consider that trade unions represent mainly the interests of those 
who are employed. In tendency, they are less interested in reducing the unemployment rate, 
because this could come at the cost of lower wage increases. Thus, a permanently high 
unemployment rate could also suggest some misalignment of either labor market legislation 
or the wage bargaining process.  
Summary  
 
A common feature of the principles discussed above is the strong preference for general 
rules, both in the market and for the public sector. The ultimate reason can be interpreted in 
terms  of  game  theory:  Without  binding  rules,  time  inconsistent  decisions  and  lack  of 
reliability would lead to myopic behavior which would damage efficiency and hence welfare 
in the long run. A second general concern of ordoliberalism is the unity of decision power 
and liability. This concern also underlies the deep skepticism of public interventions, because 
politicians and bureaucrats neither bear personal responsibility for what they decide nor do 
they have a particularly long-term perspective.  
Similar concerns apply to salaried managers, in particular in companies with limited liability. 
These concerns are indeed strongly supported by modern institutional economics, including 
the  theories  of  bureaucracy  and  political  economy.
21 In  a  way,  every  political  market 
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intervention converts private in public goods, to a certain degree at least. This  not only 
weakens the power of market incentives, but is also likely to result in political quarrel where, 
in the end, the maximization of votes will prevail over the maximization of common welfare. 
In particular, minorities suffer the risk of being completely ignored or even exploited, while 
in the market process they can pursue their interests in the same way as everyone else, 
within the limits of their endowment at least. In this way, a political element innately exists 
in ordoliberalism, which ultimately cannot be separated from economic reasoning.  
It is also important to note that the ordoliberal principles are seen as an entity, which cannot 
be broken off in order to select only those elements which seem convenient. For example, 
the market mechanism cannot work properly in order to reduce unemployment if wages are 
fixed at too high of a level or if welfare policy weakens the incentives of the unemployed to 
find a new job. Analogously, competition between firms fails to guarantee efficiency if within 
the firms’ decision-making power, authority and liability are separated. At the same time, 
the market mechanism cannot survive if a fair chance does not exist for anyone who is 
willing to participate in the market place to reap the benefits of his effort. Last but not least, 
in the ordoliberal view, a free society requires a liberal economy and vice versa. Eucken 
himself called this the interdependency of constitution.  
 In this light, the appropriate question is not whether some elements of the  ordoliberal 
concept are good or bad in one respect or the other, but if the concept as a whole can keep 
its  promise  to  foster  a  wealthy,  responsible  and  free  society.  This  is  what  is  to  be 
investigated in subsequent research.  
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